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Abstract 
 
 
COORDINATION OF PRICING AND 
PRODUCTION-SCHEDULING DECISIONS IN 
SUPPLY CHAINS 
 
 
Muzaffer Mısırcı 
M.S. in Industrial Engineering 
Supervisor: Prof. İhsan Sabuncuoğlu, Assist. Prof. Ayşegül Toptal 
September 2008 
 
Integration of various business functions ranging from procurement and distribution 
activities to customer relations has gained importance due to the progressively 
increasing global and domestic competitive pressures. As a consequence, many firms 
have set out to design, develop, and install their supply chain solutions. 
 
The existing literature on wholesale price contracts takes into account the ordering 
and inventory holding component of the total. However, the impact of capacity 
considerations is overlooked in the coordination of replenishment decisions.  
 
In this thesis, our objective is to synchronize the production planning and pricing 
decisions in buyer-vendor systems. In order to achieve this objective, the vendor 
quotes a price schedule that is a function of delivery time and order quantity. This 
price schedule stimulates the manipulation of buyer’s order time and quantities so as 
to minimize vendor’s total costs without changing the buyers’ profit position.  
 
 
 
Keywords:  supply chain, pricing, production planning, price menu, coordination 
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Özet 
 
 
TEDARİK ZİNCİRLERİNDE 
FİYATLANDIRMA VE ÜRETİM-PLANLAMA 
KARARLARININ KOORDİNASYONU  
 
Muzaffer Mısırcı 
Endüstri Mühendisliği Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. İhsan Sabuncuoğlu, Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ayşegül Toptal 
Eylül 2008 
 
 
Giderek ağırlaşan iç ve dış rekabet koşulları firmaların satın alma faliyetlerinden, 
ürünlerinin dağıtımına ve müşteri ilişkilerine kadar olan iş süreçlerinin entegrasyonunu 
zorunlu hale getirmiştir. Bu yüzden günümüzde çok sayıda firma tedarik zinciri yönetimi 
sistemlerini kurmaya başlamışlardır. Ancak bu konuda çok gelişmiş ve her sektörün 
ihtiyacını karşılayan maliyet etkin çözümlerin olmayışı önemli bir eksiklik olarak ortaya 
çıkmaktadır. 
 
Bu konu ile ilgili geçmişte yapılan bilimsel çalışmalar, alıcı ve satıcı arasındaki ticari 
ilişkinin koordinasyonunu sipariş verme ve envanter tutma maliyetleri çerçevesinde ele 
almakla beraber, satıcı firmanın olası kapasite kısıtlarını göz ardı etmektedir. 
 
Biz bu tezde tedarikçi ve müşteri arasındaki koordinasyonun sağlanmasında önemli bir 
etken olan üretim planlama ve fiyatlandırma kararlarını sistematik bir yaklaşımla karar 
sürecıne dahil etmeyi amaçlıyoruz. Bu sistematik yaklaşımın temelinde yatan düşünce, 
tedarikçi firmanın miktara dayalı fiyat politikasını belirlerken, müşterilerden gelecek sipariş 
profilini kendi üretim maliyetlerini azaltacak yönde etkilemesidir. İstenen etkinin 
gerçekleşmesi için belirlenen fiyat politikası, müşterilerin yeni talep profilleri sonunda 
oluşacak kar durumlarını azaltmamalıdır. 
 
 
   
Anahtar Kelimeler: tedarik zinciri, üretim planlama, fiyatlandırma, fiyat menüsü, 
koordinasyon 
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 C h a p t e r  1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  
Supply chain management is a relatively new area in manufacturing and 
service operations management. The need for managing the materials and 
information across the supply chain originates from the fact that the actions taken 
by one member of the chain can influence the profitability of the others. It has 
been shown in various studies that significant savings can be achieved due to 
coordinating the independently made decisions of the parties in supply chain 
systems. Therefore, many firms have set out to design, develop, and install their 
supply chain solutions to cope with the increasing global and domestic 
competitive pressures.  The investment  on supply chain optimization amounts to 
a scale of three million dollars in Turkey and to one billion dollar around the 
world. This indicates a need and an opportunity for the development of effective 
decision-support tools for supply chain management. 
The evolution of supply chain management initiates from the classical multi-
echelon inventory theory. The studies on multi-echelon inventory systems  (e.g., 
Clark and Scarf  (1960), Federgruen and Zipkin (1984),) suggest that the 
companies make their inventory replenishment decisions jointly. The major 
pursuit of the more recent studies is to introduce certain mechanisms into supply 
chain systems for alligning the individual incentives of the companies with the 
system performance, while still allowing independent decision making.  In view 
of this trend, much of the recent research effort on supply chain management has 
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been spent to develop mechanisms for coordinating the system and to evaluate 
their effectiveness in different settings.  
As it will be discussed in detail in the following section, a majority of the 
studies that could fall into this second body of research, takes minimization of 
inventory related costs as a performance measure. Few studies appeared in the 
more recent literature on supply chain management which consider other supply 
chain  functionalities in addition to inventory management . For example, Toptal 
and Çetinkaya (2006) investigate the contractual agreements for supply chain 
coordination under the consideration of the vendor’s inbound and outbound 
transportation costs.   
In addition to inventory holding and transportation, another important function 
that affects supply chain costs significantly, is production scheduling. It is 
important to note that, the above mentioned literature  overlooks production 
capacity and scheduling considerations at the vendor/manufacturer. However, in 
real life, a manufacturer may accept/reject orders on the basis of capacity 
constraints and he/she may quote varying wholesale prices for orders with 
different due-dates depending on resource availability. Better yet, he/she may 
adjust the wholesale prices to change the ordering behaviors of the buyers/retailers 
for increasing supply chain efficacy through better utilization of the capacity. 
This, in fact, is the opportunity at stake, which also, is the motivation to our study.   
In this thesis, a single period, stochastic demand environment with one 
vendor/manufacturer and multiple buyers/retailers is considered, and the 
production capacity at the vendor1 is modeled explicitly. The vendor’s 
manufacturing plant is regarded as a single machine, and his/her earliness and 
tardiness costs resulting from the aggregate scheduling decisions are taken into 
account in computing his/her expected profits. The main objective of the thesis is 
                                                 
1
 In the remaining parts of the thesis, “vendor” and “manufacturer”, and “buyer” and “retailer” will 
be used interchangeably.  
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the design of contracts between the vendor and the buyers under careful 
consideration of the vendor’s production capacity. To achive this objective, a 
novel contract type is proposed and is compared to a more traditional one.  The 
proposed contract allows the vendor to offer delivery time dependent wholesale 
prices to the retailers. The vendor considers the production capacity and 
scheduling decisions explicitly in determining the wholesale prices, and plans to 
deliver all accepted orders on time. Furthermore, the models constructed for this 
contract, enable the computation of wholesale prices which maximize the 
vendor’s net profits while maintaining the buyers’ potential profits that would 
result from their independent decisions. Then, the proposed contract type is 
compared to a more traditional one which allows the vendor to complete  and 
deliver the accepted orders later than their promised duedates, while making a 
fixed payment (i.e., penalty cost) to the related retailer(s) in compensation. In this 
contractual agreement, wholesale prices do not depend on delivery times. Through 
an extensive numerical analysis, it is shown that considerable savings can be 
achieved by the proposed contractual agreement. 
The organization of the thesis will be as follows. In the next chapter, a review 
of the literature is provided. In Chapter 3, the two contractual agreements are 
formulated, and the manufacturer’s and the retailers’ profit functions in each 
contract are derived. The following chapter analyzes the manufacturer’s profit 
maximization problem in the proposed contract. Chapter 5 presents the 
experimental design and discusses the numerical results. Finally, in Chapter 6, 
general conclusions of this study are summarized. 
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C h a p t e r  2  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 This study is closely related to the body of work on multi-echelon inventories, 
supply chain management and contracting theory. Optimization of serial inventory 
systems, i.e., multi-echelon inventories, dates back to 1960s with the pioneering 
work of Clark and Scarf (1960) for a stochastic demand environment. Following 
this study, numerous other researchers investigated the problem under different 
assumptions (e.g., Federgruen and Zipkin (1984), Debodt and Graves (1985), 
Rosling (1985)). Federgruen (1993) provides an excellent review of the literature 
on multi-echelon inventories. A common property of all the studies in this review 
paper is that, they model a decision-making system in which the suppliers and the 
retailers make their inventory and production decisions jointly, in a centralized 
manner. However, in real life, the implementation of a centralized model is very 
difficult unless the companies belong to the same corporation, or the vendor 
manages and owns the inventory at the buyer(s) as in a VMI (Vendor Managed 
Inventory) system. Çetinkaya and Lee (2000), Toptal et al. (2003) are some 
examples of recent papers that study the coordination problem in VMIs.   
 An alternative approach to the centralized modeling is the decentralized 
modeling, in which the supply chain players make their decisions on their own, 
with limited information sharing. However, it is known that the decentralized 
modeling approach results in a reduction of total system profits relative to the 
centralized modeling approach. In other words, the independent action of one 
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member of the supply chain may make others worse. This concept is referred to as 
“Double Marginalization” (Spengler, 1950) in the literature. One of the earlier 
studies in operations management which illustrate the gap between the two 
modeling approaches, is by Goyal (1976). Starting from this work, there has been 
an increasing trend in supply chain studies to investigate ways for improving the 
outcome of the decentralized model for a system, by using the corresponding 
centralized model as a benchmark. The idea of aligning the individual incentives 
for all parties in a decentralized model with those of the centralized solution is 
known as channel coordination in the literature. This is done by manipulating the 
system parameters such as wholesale price, salvage value etc., a.k.a., coordination 
mechanisms. The values of the system parameters involved in the coordination 
mechanisms are determined either by the supplier(s) or retailer(s) depending on 
who initiates coordination, and they are formalized in a contract. 
 There are many coordination mechanisms whose applicability depends on the 
supply chain characteristics, e.g., deterministic versus stochastic demand, the 
relationship between demand and wholesale price. Some examples to the most 
common contractual agreement types are: 
i. Wholesale Price Contracts 
ii. Sales Rebate Contracts 
iii. Buyback Contracts 
iv. Revenue Sharing Contracts  
v. Quantity Discount Contracts 
vi. Quantity Flexibility Contracts 
 In a wholesale price contract, the supplier sets the wholesale price which does 
not differ with respect to purchasing quantities. Lariviere and Porteus (2001), 
Cachon (2004), Bresnahan and Reis (1985) are examples of papers that study 
wholesale price contracts in a single-retailer, single-vendor system. While the 
former two studies are concerned with single period stochastic demand 
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environment, Bresnahan and Reis (1985) consider a deterministic demand setting. 
The design and implementation of wholesale price contracts in the presence of 
multiple retailers exhibits certain challenges. This is mostly due to the fact that 
price differentiation is prohibited in many countries by legislation, e.g., the 
Robinson-Patman Act in USA. Wang and Gerchak (2001) analyzes wholesale 
price contracts when there are multiple retailers.  
 In a sales rebate contract, a retailer pays the wholesale price set by supplier but 
then the supplier gives the retailer some amount for each unit sold above a 
threshold value. This contract form is studied by Taylor (2000a) and Krishman et 
al. (2001). Both papers focus on the coordination in the presence of retail effort. 
More specifically, a retailer can increase the demand for a product by lowering the 
retail price, but there are other ways to do this such as hiring more sales people, 
providing more training to current sales people, investing more in advertising or 
making the stores more attractive to customers etc. Such retail effort is mostly 
very costly to retailers. In this regard, Taylor (2000a) and Krishman et al. (2001) 
allow the retailer to exert effort to increase demand. In particular, Taylor (2000a) 
focuses on simultaneous decision effort and order quantity, whereas in Krishnan et 
al. (2001) an order quantity is first chosen and then effort level is decided after a 
signal of demand.  
 In a buyback contract, a retailer purchases each unit at a given wholesale price, 
and if there are some unsold items at the retailer at the end of the selling season, 
the supplier buys back some amount of the remaining quantity at a lower value 
than the wholesale price. The studies on buyback contracts consider several issues 
such as price policies, competition among retailers and retailer sales effort to make 
the system coordinated (e.g., Pasternack (1985), Emmons and Gilbert (1998), 
Padmanabhan and Png (1997), Taylor (2000a)). 
 In a revenue sharing contract, a retailer pays a wholesale price for each unit 
purchased plus a percentage of the revenue based on actual sales. There are a few 
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studies on this contract type, the most comprehensive one is done by Cachon and 
Larivierre (2005).  They consider a general supply chain model where demand can 
be either deterministic or stochastic. This study also takes into account the case 
when supplier sells to a fixed-price newsvendor or a price-setting newsvendor.  
 Another contract type to coordinate a supply chain system is quantity discount 
contracts. In this contract type. a price discount is offered for large order sizes. 
Quantity discount contracts were first introduced into the marketing literature by 
Jeuland and Shugan (1983). In the operations research literature, Monahan (1984) 
is a pioneering work. Several extensions of this work consider the same problem 
under different settings. Banerjee (1986), Lee and Rosenblatt (1986) are examples 
of studies in a single-vendor, single-retailer setting. Hoffman (2000) analyzes 
quantity discount contracts for a system with multiple heterogeneous retailers. All 
these studies that are reviewed until now within the context of quantity discounts, 
assume that demand is independent of the retail price. Weng (1995) shows that it 
is not possible to coordinate the system with a quantity discount contract when 
demand is a decreasing function of retail price. However, if the retailers accept to 
pay a fixed amount to the supplier, the system can be coordinated.  
 The last contract type is a quantity flexibility contract. In these contracts, the 
supplier sets a wholesale price and compensates the retailer for the losses that 
result from unsold goods. This contract type provides full protection to the retailer 
on a portion of its order whereas the buyback contract partially protects the retailer 
on its complete order. If the supplier did not compensate the retailer’s cost per unit 
which is additional cost to supplier’s production cost, then the retailer would be 
partially protected. This is referred to as a backup agreement (e.g., Eppen and Iyer 
(1997)). Tsay (1999) studies supply chain coordination with quantity flexibility 
contracts and identifies the inefficiencies resulting from demand uncertainty. 
Quantity flexibility contracts are also studied in more complex settings including 
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multiple locations, multiple demand periods, lead times and demand forecast 
updates (e.g., Tsay and Lovejoy (1999)).    
 In addition to these six contract types, there are other studies in supply chain 
coordination, which consider price dependent demand (e.g., Bernstein and 
Federgruen (2000)), effort dependent demand (e.g., Netessine and Rudi (2000a), 
Gerchak (2001), and Gilbert and Cvsa (2000)), and demand updating (e.g., 
Donohue (2000), Mieghem (1999)).  
 Many of the studies reviewed above assume information symmetry, that is, 
both parties are aware of the knowledge about the system operations and 
parameters. An issue that has been recently addressed in the contracting literature 
is information asymmetry.  As examples, see Corbett and Groote (2000), Ha 
(2001). 
 It is important to note that although there is a growing body of research that 
analyzes the effectiveness of different contractual agreements under various 
conditions, there is no study that integrates the scheduling decisions with supply 
chain coordination. Charnsirisakskul et al. (2005) is the most related paper to our 
research. They study a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and multiple 
retailers. Each retailer is quoted a wholesale price determined by the size of order. 
After collecting all orders, the manufacturer solves an optimization problem under 
capacity constraints. The output provides the manufacturer with the information of 
which orders are accepted, the production schedule and delivery times of the 
orders. Although this research is quite similar to our study, its main focus is on the 
benefits of leadtime flexibility under capacity constrained production by quoting 
different prices for different order sizes. In addition, there is no consideration for 
supply chain coordination and no mechanism is proposed to guide the 
manufacturer to achieve this objective. Thus, our research will provide a 
contribution to fill this gap in the literature.  
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C h a p t e r  3  
 
PROBLEM FORMULATION  
 
 
 This research considers a decentralized two-stage supply chain consisting of a 
manufacturer and multiple retailers. The products that retailers order from the 
manufacturer are alike and require the same resources at the manufacturer's site. 
There is a single period of finite length, i.e. the demand period illustrated in 
Figure-1, during which random amounts of demand appear for the products. A 
retailer may have more than one product type to order. For the sake of generality, 
we use an index i  ( 1, 2,...,i N= ) to refer to a specific order, which is identified by 
its retailer and the product type jointly. The manufacturer announces the 
wholesale prices and the retailers decide on the optimal order quantities to 
maximize their expected profits. If the order quantity is not enough to satisfy the 
demand, then a retailer incurs a shortage cost per unsatisfied demand. If it is more 
than the demand, excess items are salvaged at a constant value per unit. The 
manufacturer has a finite production period, during which he/she has to produce 
the orders. Due to the limited production capacity, the manufacturer has the liberty 
of rejecting some orders. Transportation cost and time from the manufacturer to 
any of the retailers are negligible. Similarly, there is no cost or time spent by the 
manufacturer for production setups. 
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Figure 1: Production and Demand Periods (t1≤t2<t3<t4) 
 
 For this system, we propose a new contractual agreement that may increase 
manufacturers’ profits through a better utilization of his/her capacity. This is 
achieved by integration of the manufacturer's pricing and scheduling decisions. 
More specifically, the manufacturer offers a delivery time dependent wholesale 
price for each product type, which changes the retailers' ordering behavior in such 
a way that the manufacturer's production schedule is improved. We refer to this 
contract as delivery-date-dependent pricing (DTDP). We compare this type of 
contractual agreement to a more traditional one that we refer to as fixed wholesale 
pricing with tardiness penalty (FWPT). As the name implies, in this contract, the 
announced wholesale price by the manufacturer is constant regardless of the 
delivery time. If a delay occurs in the delivery time, a tardiness penalty is paid by 
the manufacturer at a predetermined rate per unit per unit time of delay. 
 Under these considerations, we next present a detailed description of the two 
contract types. 
 Contract FWPT: 
• The manufacturer announces the wholesale prices before his/her 
production period begins. Wholesale prices are fixed and do not depend on 
order quantities or delivery times. 
  Production Period  
t1 t2 t3 t4 Time 
            Demand Period 
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• Retailers decide on their optimal order quantities as if their orders will be 
delivered before the demand period begins. 
• When all orders are received, the manufacturer accepts the ones that 
jointly maximize his/her profit under a limited production capacity. 
• All accepted orders are quoted a delivery time of 2t . However, if an order 
is delivered to its retailer after time 2t , $ iS  per unit is paid by the 
manufacturer for each unit time of delay. 
 
 It is important to note that, in this type of contract, the actual delivery time of 
an order may be different from the quoted delivery time. Furthermore, in case the 
manufacturer delays the delivery of an order, its quantity does not change and is 
given by the retailer's expected profit maximizer in period [ 2t , 4t ]. 
 Contract DTDP: 
• The manufacturer announces the wholesale prices before the production 
period, however different prices are quoted for different delivery times of 
an order. 
• Each retailer evaluates the wholesale price, delivery time information and 
chooses a pair that maximizes his/her expected profits. 
• Due to his/her limited production capacity, a manufacturer may again 
reject some of the orders. 
• All accepted orders must be delivered no later than their quoted delivery 
times. 
 
 In the setting that is of interest in this paper, we assume that the manufacturer 
has full information about the demand process and the cost parameters of each 
retailer. Under this assumption, Contract DTDP allows the manufacturer to come 
up with a price schedule that implicitly forces a retailer to choose a wholesale 
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price, delivery time pair that increases the manufacturer's profits while keeping the 
retailer satisfied. For modeling this type of a contract, we assume that there are 
1K +  different delivery dates that a manufacturer can quote to a retailer within the 
production period. We index the delivery dates by k  (i.e., kd ) where 0k =  refers 
to the start time of the manufacturer's production period. We assume that the 
demand for order i  from time kd  to the end of the demand period has a 
probability distribution with mean of kiµ  and standard deviation of kiσ  . Note that, 
in Contract FWPT , 0K =  and 0 2d t= . 
 In Contract DTDP, a retailer decides the delivery time of an order among a 
menu of wholesale price, delivery time pairs, and the manufacturer delivers an 
accepted order no later than that time. Therefore, a retailer who chooses a delivery 
date kd  such that 2kd t> , takes into account the expected demand lost until kd , 
and thereby, the new demand process with parameters kiµ  and kiσ .  
 Before analyzing the manufacturer's and the retailers' expected profits 
resulting from the two contract types, we summarize below the notation 
introduced so far and that will be used throughout the paper. 
  ir  : Retail price per unit of Order i . 
 Q  : Quantity of an order. 
 X  : Random variable showing total demand at a retailer. 
 
w
 : Wholesale price. 
 iw  : Market price for one unit of Order i . 
 ( ).kif  : Probability density function of demand for order i  from time kd  to 
the end of the demand period. 
 ( ).kiF  : Probability distribution function of demand for order i  from time kd  
to the end of the demand period. 
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 ( ),ij ijw d  :  A wholesale price, delivery time pair for the i th retailer. Here, j  is 
the index of the pair. 
 ib  : Lost sale cost/unit of Order i . 
 ig  : Salvage value/unit of Order i . 
 ih  : Inventory cost of the manufacturer for holding one unit of Order i  for a 
unit time. 
 iS  : Tardiness cost paid by the manufacturer for a unit time delay of Order i . 
 ip  : Manufacturer's processing time per unit of Order i . 
 ic  : Manufacturer's production cost per unit of Order i . 
 kd  : Value of delivery date k  ( 0 2d t= ). 
 ϑ  : Contractual agreement type (FWPT or DTDP). 
 C  : Completion time of an order. 
 T  : Length of the manufacturer's production period. 
 ( ), ,i Q w Cϑ∏  : Expected profits of the retailer for Order i  in Contract ϑ . 
 ( ), ,i Q w CϑΨ  : Manufacturer's profits from Order i  in Contract ϑ . 
 ( ),i Q CϑΘ  : Tardiness penalty paid by the manufacturer for Order i  in 
Contract ϑ . 
 The tardiness penalty paid by the manufacturer for Order i in Contract FWPT 
is 
( ) ( )2 2   eger ,
0                   aksi taktirde
iFWTP
i
C t S Q C tQ C − ≥  Θ =  
  
                                               (1) 
Recall that in Contract DTDP, there is no tardiness cost. Therefore, we have 
( ), 0DTDPi Q CΘ = .                                                                            (2) 
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The expected profit of the retailer who places Order i  is then given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,k ki i i i i i i i i i
Q
Q w C r g w g Q r g b x Q f x dx Q Cϑ ϑµ
∞
∏ = − − − − − + − + Θ∫       (3) 
where { }{ }arg min : , 0,1,...,kk k C d k K= ≤ ∈ . The above expression is based on the 
following two assumptions: (i) the manufacturer delivers an order as soon as it is 
completed, (ii) the closest delivery time available larger than the planned 
completion time is quoted to the retailer. Notice that, these assumptions lead to the 
fact that, in Contract DTDP, the expectation of the retailer in terms of his/her 
profit for Order i  is independent of the actual completion time as long as different 
completion times result in the same delivery date. That is, we have 
( ) ( )1 2, , , ,DTDP DTDPi iQ w C Q w C∏ = ∏ , where  1 1k kd C d− < ≤ , 1 2k kd C d− < ≤  and 
1 2C C≠ . On the other hand, Contract FWPT implies that 
( ) ( )2 1, , , ,FWTP FWTPi iQ w C Q w C∏ > ∏  for 1k ≥ . That is, under the assumption that the 
demand distribution does not change from 1C  to 2C , in Contract FWPT , the 
retailer is better off if his/her tardy-to-be order is delayed further. More 
specifically, depending on the lost sales cost and the value of tardiness cost, there 
may be cases where a retailer may increase his/her profits due to delayed orders. 
 The manufacturer's profit from Order i  in both of the contracts is 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1, , ,
2
i i
i i i
Q Q h pQ w C Q w c Q Cϑ ϑ+Ψ = − − − Θ                                   (4) 
The manufacturer's inventory holding cost, which is the second term of 
Expression (4), utilizes the fact his/her optimal sequence in both contract types is 
non-preemptive. Also, inventory holding costs start to accumulate for a product in 
Order i , at a rate of $ ih  per unit time, from the moment its processing begins until 
the whole order is completed.  
 In Contract FWPT , the retailer of Order i  solves the following problem: 
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( )
{ }
FWTP
i 2max   , ,
s.t.   Q 0
iQ w t
Z +
Π
∈ ∪
 
where Z +  denotes the set of positive integers. Note that the optimal quantity that 
maximizes the expected profits of the retailer placing Order i  (i.e., iQ ∗  ) is given 
by 
{ } ( )0min 0  i i ii i
i i i
r w bQ Q Z F Q
r g b
∗ + − +
= ∈ ∪ ≥ 
− + 
                                        (5)  
 In Contract DTDP, the retailer of Order i  is offered a menu of delivery dates 
with corresponding wholesale prices, and he/she chooses the pair that maximizes 
his/her expected profits as follows: 
  
( )
{ }
DTDP
imax   , ,
s.t.  Q 0 ,
ij ijQ w d
Z j+
Π
∈ ∪ ∀
 
 In both of the contractual agreements, after the manufacturer receives the 
optimal order quantities for all orders, he/she prepares the production schedule. 
Due to his/her limited production capacity, the manufacturer may reject some of 
the orders. Recall that, in contract DT DP, the manufacturer offers a delivery time 
dependent price schedule before the orders are collected. This gives the 
manufacturer the opportunity to consider beforehand his/her scheduling decisions 
simultaneously with pricing decisions, and thereby, to increase his/her profits 
under limited capacity. In using pricing as a mechanism to change the ordering 
behaviors of the retailers, the manufacturer should put the expected profits of the 
accepted retailers no worse than what they would be under the market price with a 
delivery time 2t . That is, the expected profit for Order i , if it is accepted under 
Contract DTDP, should at least be equal to ( )2, ,FWTPi i iQ w t∗∏ . Otherwise, the 
retailer who owns Order i  may reject the business of the current manufacturer and 
may find alternative suppliers in the market. For a single order, there may be 
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several wholesale price, delivery date pairs (i.e., ( ),ij ijw d ) that put the retailer's 
expected profits no worse than ( )2, ,FWTPi i iQ w t∗∏ . Considering all such pairs over 
all orders, the manufacturer should choose a pair for each order such that when all 
retailers demand the optimal order quantities under those pairs, the manufacturer 
achieves the maximum profit under limited production capacity. Finally, the 
manufacturer prepares a menu of prices and delivery dates for each order. In order 
to model the manufacturer's perspective in Contract DTDP, we will follow the 
below steps: 
I. Finding ( ),ij ijw d  pairs that put the retailer's expected profits no worse than 
( )2, ,FWTPi i iQ w t∗∏  for each Order i . The vector of all such pairs for Order i  
will be denoted by iJ .This step will be referred to as Preparation of 
Wholesale Prices and Delivery Dates. 
II. Among iJ  number of pairs for Order i , finding the one those results in 
the maximum profit for the manufacturer with other orders, for all i . This 
step will be referred to as Preparation of the Price Menu.  
  
 Next, we will analyze these steps as parts of the manufacturer's sub-problem. 
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C h a p t e r  4  
 
Manufacturer's Subproblem in Contract 
DTDP 
4.1 Preparation of Wholesale prices and Delivery Times 
 
 In this section, we present a search algorithm to identify ( ),ij ijw d  pairs that put 
the retailer's expected profits no worse than ( )2, ,FWTPi i iQ w t∗∏  for each Order i . 
This search algorithm will utilize the following proposition and the remark. 
 Proposition 1: Let 1Q  and 2Q   be two order quantities that maximize the 
expected profits or a retailer for Order i  for a given delivery date kd  at wholesale 
prices 1w  and 2w , respectively. That is, 1Q  satisfies ( ) 11k i ii
i i i
r w bF Q
r g b
− +
=
− +
 and 2Q  
satisfies ( ) 22k i ii
i i i
r w bF Q
r g b
− +
=
− +
. If 2 1Q Q> , then we have 
                     ( ) ( ) { }2 2 1 1, , , , , 0,1,...,DTDP DTDPi k i kQ w d Q w d k K∏ > ∏ ∀ ∈  
 Proof: Using Expression (3), we have             
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1 1 1 1, ,
DTDP k k
i k i i i i i i i i
Q
Q w d r g w g Q r g b x Q f x dxµ
∞
∏ = − − − − − + −∫       (6) 
and 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2 2 2 2 2, ,
DTDP k k
i k i i i i i i i i
Q
Q w d r g w g Q r g b x Q f x dxµ
∞
∏ = − − − − − + −∫    (7) 
Plugging in ( ) ( )1 1ki i i i i iw r b r g b F Q= + − − +  and 
( ) ( )2 2ki i i i i iw r b r g b F Q= + − − +  in Expressions (6) and (7), respectively, we have 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1, ,
DTDP k k
i k i i i i i i i
Q
Q w d r g r g b xf x dxµ
∞
∏ = − − − + ∫    
and 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2 2, ,
DTDP k k
i k i i i i i i i
Q
Q w d r g r g b xf x dxµ
∞
∏ = − − − + ∫  
Since 2 1Q Q> , using the above two equations, it follows that 
  ( ) ( )2 2 1 1, , , ,DTDP DTDPi k i kQ w d Q w d∏ > ∏  
In order to form iJ  for each Order i , we propose an algorithm that is based on a 
search procedure over Q  for a given kd  over all { }1,2,...,k K∈ . 
 Algorithm I: 
 (A1) Start with the first delivery date (i.e., 2t ) and set the index of the first pair 
to zero. That is, 0k =  and 0j = . 
 (A2) For the current delivery date kd , using Algorithm 2, find the smallest 
integer Q such that ( ) ( )2, , , ,DTDP FWTPi k i i iQ w d Q w t∗∏ ≥ ∏  where 
( ) ( )ki i i i i iw r b r g b F Q= + − − + . If none exists, go to Step (A4). Otherwise, set 
( ) ( ), ,ij ij kw d w d= , ( ), ,FWTPi km Q w d= Ψ  and 1j j= + . 
 (A3) Increase Q one by one and find the wholesale price at which Q is 
optimal, until the wholesale price falls below ic . Add new pairs for quantities that 
increase the manufacturer's profits. That is, 
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1. Set Q = Q + 1. 
2. Set ( ) ( )ki i i i i iw r b r g b F Q= + − − + . 
3. If iw c≤ , go to Step (A4). 
4. If ( ), ,FWTPi kQ w d mΨ > , set ( ) ( ), ,ij ij kw d w d= , ( ), ,FWTPi km Q w d= Ψ  and 
1j j= + . Go to Step (A3).1. 
 (A4) Proceed with the next available delivery date. If there is none, stop the 
algorithm. That is, 
1. If k K< , set 1k k= +  and go to Step (A2). 
2. Else, set iJ j=  and stop the algorithm returning iJ . 
 Algorithm II: 
 (B1) If 0k = , stop and return iQ Q ∗= .  
 (B2) Compute the retailer's optimum order quantity at the market price 
assuming that the order is quoted a delivery date of kd . That is, find the minimum 
integer Q  such that ( )k i i ii
i i i
r w bF Q
r g b
− +
≥
− +
. If ( ) ( )2, , , ,DTDP FWTPi i k i i iQ w d Q w t∗∏ ≥ ∏ , 
go to Step (B3). Else, go to Step (B4). 
 (B3) Decrease Q  one by one until ( ) ( )2, , , ,DTDP FWTPi k i i iQ w d Q w t∗∏ < ∏  where 
( ) ( )ki i i i i iw r b r g b F Q= + − − + , or 1Q =  . If ( ) ( )2, , , ,DTDP FWTPi k i i iQ w d Q w t∗∏ < ∏  
is reached first, stop and return 1Q + . If 1Q =  is reached first, stop and return Q . 
 (B4) Increase Q  one by one until ( ) ( )2, , , ,DTDP FWTPi k i i iQ w d Q w t∗∏ ≥ ∏  or 
iw c<  where ( ) ( )ki i i i i iw r b r g b F Q= + − − + . If 
( ) ( )2, , , ,DTDP FWTPi k i i iQ w d Q w t∗∏ ≥ ∏  is reached first, stop and return Q . If iw c<  
is reached first, stop and return null. 
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 Algorithm I in conjunction with Algorithm II, provides the set iJ  for a given 
order. Notice that, a wholesale price, delivery date pair within this set result in an 
expected profit of at least ( )2, ,FWTPi i iQ w t∗∏ . Therefore, we assume any pair in 
this set is acceptable by the retailer of Order i . After the manufacturer finds all 
such pairs for all orders by running Algorithm I for 1,2,...,i N= , he/she prepares 
the production schedule. In the next section, we present a model for the 
manufacturer to decide which orders he/she will accept, and what wholesale price 
and delivery date he/she will quote for accepted orders, while preparing his/her 
production schedule. 
4.2 Preparation of Price Menu 
 
 In the previous section, we presented an algorithm for the manufacturer to find 
wholesale price values paired with delivery dates for an Order i , which put the 
ordering retailer in a no worse expected profits than ( )2, ,FWTPi i iQ w t∗∏ . Next, we 
present an optimization model for the manufacturer to decide which orders to 
accept/reject, and the best wholesale price, delivery date pair for each accepted 
order that maximizes his/her expected profits under limited production capacity. 
 The decision variables in this optimization model are as follows: 
 
1  if  pair is chosen for Order 
0 otherwise
th
ij
j i
y
 
=  
 
 
1   if Order , for which  pair is chosen, is scheduled before 
       Order , for which  pair is chosen
0  otherwise
th
th
ijlm
i j
x i m
 
 
=  
 
 
 
1 if Order  for which  pair is chosen, is completed after 
0 otherwise
th
ij
ij
i j d
α
  
=  
  
  
 21
 ijC : Production finish time of production of Order i  for j th pair 
 The mathematical model presented below can be used to make the scheduling 
and order acceptance/rejection decisions in both contractual agreements. More 
specifically, for Contract DTDP, iS  is set to a very large number, and set iJ  
formed according to Algorithm I, is used for each order. For Contract FWPT, iS  is 
set to its value as it is determined by the manufacturer, and iJ  only includes 
( 2,iw t ). 
 Before proceeding with the mathematical model, we define one more notation. 
Let k  be the index of delivery date ijd  . For pair ( ijw  , ijd  ), we define ijQ  as 
follows: 
  { } ( )min 0  i ij ikij i
i i i
r w bQ Q Z F Q
r g b
+
 − + 
= ∈ ∪ ≥ 
− +  
 
 If the following model results in 0ijy =  for all pairs j  in set iJ , this implies 
that Order i  is rejected. Otherwise, it is accepted. 
 MODEL I :  
 Objective Function 
 
( ) ( )
( )
1 0 1 0
1 0
1
max 2
                            
J JN N ij i i ij ij
ij ij ij i
i j i j
JN
ij ij ij ij ij i
i j
i i
i
y p h Q Q
 y Q w c   
y C  d Q Sα
= = = =
= =
+
− −
− −
∑∑ ∑∑
∑∑
                                            (8) 
 Constraints 
 Don’t exceed the total capacity 
 
1 0
JN
ij i ij
i j
i
Q p y T         
= =
≤∑∑                                                                                       (9) 
 Determine a wholesale price for accepted orders 
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0
1 for all 
J
ij
j
i
y        i
=
≤∑                                                                                        (10) 
 Precedence relationships and capacity allocations 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x x 1          for all  ve ,  such that , ,ijlm lmij     i, j l m i j l m+ = ≠                      (11)  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1   for all  ve ,  
                                                               
                                                               such that , ,
lm ij lm l ijlm ijlmC C  Q p x x  M   i, j l m
i j l m
− ≥ − −
≠                       (12) 
 Orders cannot be completed at time zero 
 ( )  for allij ij iC Q p       i, j≥                                                                                 (13) 
 Determine tardiness amounts 
 ( )  for allij ij ijC d M      i, jα− ≤                                                                          (14) 
 Define range of decision variables 
 { } ( ) ( )01          for all  ve ,  such that ijlmx  ,  i, j l m i l∈ ≠                                         (15) 
 { } ( )0 1            for allijy  ,  i, j∈                                                                             (16) 
 { } ( )0 1            for allij  ,  i, jα ∈                                                                             (17) 
 The objective function in the above model includes the manufacturer's revenue 
from sales, inventory holding costs and tardiness costs for all orders that are 
accepted. Expression (9) guarantees that production capacity is not exceeded. 
Expression (10) ensures that if an order is accepted, a single wholesale price, 
delivery date pair is chosen for this order. Expressions (11) and (12) jointly 
determine the precedence relationships. Expression (13) eliminates zero 
completion times. Expression (14) determines which orders are tardy. Finally, 
Expressions (15), (16) and (17) define the range of decision variables. 
 It can be observed that the objective function in MODEL I is nonlinear. 
MODEL II that will be presented next, builds upon MODEL I and is linear. An 
additional decision variable that will be referred to as ijυ  will be used in this 
model. We define ijυ as follows: 
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 ijυ  : Tardiness amount for Order i  if j th pair is chosen for this order.  
 MODEL II : 
 Objective Function 
 
( ) ( )
1 0 1 0
1 0
1
max 2
                
J JN N ij i i ij ij
ij ij ij i
i j i j
JN
ij i ij
i j
i i
i
y p h Q Q
 y Q w c   
Q Sν
= = = =
= =
+
− −
−
∑∑ ∑∑
∑∑
                                          (18) 
 Constraints 
 Don’t exceed the total capacity 
 
1 0
JN
ij i ij
i j
i
Q p y T         
= =
≤∑∑                                                                                     (19) 
 Determine a wholesale price for accepted orders 
 
0
1 for all 
J
ij
j
i
y        i
=
≤∑                                                                                        (20) 
 Precedence relationships and capacity allocations 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x x 1          for all  ve ,  such that , ,ijlm lmij     i, j l m i j l m+ = ≠                      (21) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1   for all  and ,  
                                                           such that , ,
lm ij lm l ijlm ijlmC C  Q p x x  M   i, j l m
i j l m
− ≥ − −
≠                           (22) 
 Orders cannot be completed at time zero 
 ( )  for allij ij iC Q p       i, j≥                                                                                 (23) 
 Determine tardiness amounts 
 ( )  for allij ijy M      i, jν ≤                                                                                 (24) 
 ( ) ( )1   for allij ij ij ijC d y M      i, jν ≥ − − −                                                             (25) 
 Define range of decision variables 
 ( )0     for allij               i, jν ≥                                                                             (26)           
 { } ( ) ( )01          for all  ve ,  öyleki ijlmx  ,  i, j l m i l∈ ≠                                              (27) 
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 { } ( )0 1            for allijy  ,  i, j∈                                                                             (28) 
 The objective function in the above model includes the manufacturer's revenue 
from sales, inventory holding costs and tardiness costs for all orders that are 
accepted.  Expression (19) guarantees that production capacity is not exceeded. 
Expression (20) ensures that if an order is accepted, a single wholesale price, 
delivery date pair is chosen for this order. Expressions (21) and (22) jointly 
determine the precedence relationships. Expression (23) eliminates zero 
completion times. Expression (24) and (25) determine which orders are tardy. 
Finally, Expressions (26), (27) and (28) define the range of decision variables.  
 We realize that, after some initial runs of MODEL-I for Contract DTDP even 
for identical retailers, this formulation permits us to solve small-scale problems. 
Fortunately, by reducing the number of variables we solve sufficiently large-scales 
optimization problems for identical retailers. To achieve this, we use the following 
two facts: (1) the sequence of production orders for a given latest delivery time 
does not change the total expected profit of the manufacturer as long as they are 
consecutively produced and (2) the process should be non-preemptive whenever 
the production of an order starts. For example, consider two delivery times and 
suppose half of the orders are promised to be shipped until first delivery time and 
the rest is until the second one. Furthermore, the manufacturer uses all its 
production capacity. All non-preemptive sequences ensuring that all orders are 
shipped prior their promised times result in same profit for the manufacturer. 
Notice that first fact follows from the fact that there is no tardiness cost in 
Contract DTDP.  
 Basically, the optimization model decides which orders are selected at what 
wholesale prices for each delivery times. The model achieves this by ensuring that 
for a given delivery time total used capacity does not exceed actual capacity and 
there is no late delivery until that time.  Similar to previous models, new model 
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maximizes the total profit. For this model, we need to, in addition to previous 
notation, define the following parameters and decision variables. 
 Parameter 
 kTC : Total actual capacity until k
th delivery time 
 Decision variable  
 
1   if order  at   price is selected to be 
                  shipped until  delivery time 
0  otherwise
th
th
ijk
i j
x k
 
 
=  
 
 
 
 MODEL III 
 Objective Function 
 ( )
1 0 0 1 0 0
( 1)
max
2
i iJ JN K N K
ijk i i ij ij
ijk ij i ij
i j k i j k
x p h Q Q
 x w c Q   
= = = = = =
+
− −∑∑∑ ∑∑∑                            (29) 
 Constraints 
 If order accepted, determine a single price and delivery time 
 
0 0
1  for all 
iJ K
ijk
j k
x i
= =
≤∑∑                                                                                   (30) 
 Do not exceed the capacity 
 
1 0
   for all
iJN
ijk i ij k
i j
x p Q TC     k
= =
≤∑∑                                                                  (31) 
 Define range of variables 
 { } ( ) 0 1          for allijkx ,  i, j,k∈                                                                        (32) 
 The objective function in the above model includes the manufacturer's revenue 
from sales, and inventory holding costs for all orders that are accepted.  
Expression (30) ensures that if an order is accepted, a single wholesale price, 
delivery date pair is chosen for this order. Expression (31) guarantees that the total 
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capacity until each due-date is not exceeded.  Finally, Expression (32) defines 
binary variables.  
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C h a p t e r  5  
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND 
NUMERICAL RESULTS  
 In this section, we numerically compare Contract DTDP with Contract FWTP. 
We consider homogeneous retailers in the sense that their ordering system and its 
parameters, introduced and defined as in the previous chapter, are identical. In the 
experiments, we characterize different market settings and determine which 
contract type provides better performance under which scenarios. The numerical 
results are interpreted as managerial insights, which should provide useful 
guidance for pricing and production-scheduling decisions in various supply chain 
settings. 
5.1 Experimental Design 
 
 We consider six homogeneous retailers. Each retailer gives an order and all 
orders are for a single product. Retailer i  has a Normal demand with a mean of iµ  
and a standard deviation of  iσ , for 1, 2,...,6i = . The length of the demand period 
is set 4 2 2000t t− =  (see Figure-1). We use Normal demand in order to make the 
numerical analysis simple. More specifically, we exploit the fact that the sum of 
Normal random variables is Normal. Unit retailer price and wholesale price of the 
product in the market are 1ir =  and 0.75iw = , respectively. Retailers are not 
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subject to any salvage and backlog costs (i.e. =ib 0, =ig 0, 61,...,=i ). The 
production period is set half as long as the demand period (i.e. =− 13 tt 1000). 
 Recall that Contract DTDP requires the number of due dates to be set as an 
endogenous variable, Preliminary experimentation indicates that this variable may 
have a considerable effect on the profit obtained by the manufacturer under 
Contract DTDP. Note that no such effect is present for Contract FWTP as it 
contains a single due date which is the beginning of the demand period. In the 
case of Contract DTDP, on the other hand, it is crucially important to set the 
number of due dates in accordance with the total production capacity in the 
demand period. This is mainly due to the fact that the manufacturer applies 
discounted wholesale prices for the orders whose due dates are in the demand 
period and there will be loss in profits for the manufacturer if there are time gaps 
between due dates and production completion times. In other words, if the 
manufacturer ships the orders exactly at their due dates, then discounts will be less 
and hence, the profits of the manufacturer will be larger. As a result, the 
profitability of the manufacturer increases with the number of due dates under 
Contract DTDP.  
 Some preliminary experimentation indicates that the number of available due 
dates to ensure better performance of Contract DTDP increases with the order size 
and the number of orders to be shipped within the demand period,. In our 
experimental setting, the largest order size is 97 and we can ship at most six orders 
within the demand period. Consequently, we use 582 capacity units (set as six 
times the size of the largest order)   to graphically illustrate this effect in Figure 2 
(Data is given in Appendix-C). The figure indicates that profitability shows some 
improvement as the number of due dates increases up to a certain point and 
stabilizes thereafter. Based on preliminary results under different settings, we fix 
the number of due dates at 80 in the remainder of our experimentation. 
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Figure-2: Profitability of Contract DTDP as a function of the number of due dates 
 We vary several factors and compare the performance of the two contract 
types. On the retailer side, the only factor that we manipulate is the stochasticity 
of demand. On the manufacturer side, we focus on production capacity before and 
after the beginning of the demand period, as well as the production, inventory and 
tardiness costs. 
 Stochasticity is measured by the coefficient of variation defined as 
i i iCV σ µ=  for retailer i. CVi directly affects the optimal order sizes, which are 
given by ( ) ( )( )1 1 1ki i i i iQ CV F wµ −∗ = × − + . In Contract DTDP, optimal order sizes 
to be shipped within the demand period are affected by two issues: (1) loss of the 
demand between the due date and time of order fulfillment (2) discounts offered 
by the manufacturer. In the equation above, an optimal order size is determined as 
the sum of two terms. Stochasticity only affects the first one of these terms and it 
is independent of the aforementioned two issues affecting the optimal order size. 
This allows us to analyze the effect of stochasticity while fixing all decisions.  
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Our focus is to numerically analyze our proposal in different levels of 
stochasticity and in the experimentation, we use two levels for iCV  which are 
0.05  and 0.3  and a fixed mean value of 100iµ = .  
 Assuming that the production capacity is uniform throughout the production 
period, it is helpful to consider the production period  as of two parts before and 
after the beginning of the demand period. These two parts are of length ( )2 1t t−  
and ( )3 2t t− , respectively. We vary the capacity prior to the beginning of the 
demand period by varying 2 1t t−  between 1 to 585 units. This factor is important 
in that if ( )2 1t t−  is long enough to produce all orders, then the two contract types 
will perform equally well in terms of the manufacturer’s profit. Thus, we would 
like to illustrate the effect of capacity in ( )2 1t t−  by considering various levels of 
this factor. For 3 2t t−  or capacity during the demand period, we use four levels, 
selected as 140, 280, 420 and 585. 
 Production and inventory costs are two important factors affecting 
manufacturer’s production decisions and the relative performance of the two 
contract types. We consider the following five levels for the production cost: 0, 
0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4. Similarly, we use five levels also for the inventory cost, 
which are set at   0, 0.002, 0.003, 0.004 and 0.005. For any given production and 
inventory cost combination, we select appropriate market and wholesale prices so 
that the resulting manufacturer’s profit is positive. The values used for this factor 
is determined in a way that the manufacturer has some positive profit. Otherwise, 
the manufacturer would not prefer to process any order. 
 Tardiness cost is only included in contract FWTP. It affects the total profits 
and the number of orders accepted to be processed in contract FWTP. For 
instance, if it is high enough, there will be no order committed to be shipped 
during the demand period. We use the values of 0.0001, 0.0002, 0.0003, 0.0004 
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and 0.0005 as five alternative levels of this factor. To assess the feasibility of this 
choice, we focus on the highest possible tardiness penalty, which occurs when the 
selected order is shipped at the end of the production period. Similar to the 
previous factor, the manufacturer has incentive to make production under these 
levels for this factor. Thus, our numbers are feasible under this setting.. The 
tardiness values can also be interpreted as a measure of the relative strength of the 
two parties in the trade. If the tardiness cost is high, retailers are more influential. 
Otherwise, the manufacturer has virtually no competition and hence can govern 
the terms.  
5.2 Numerical Results 
 
 In this section, we present the experimental results in terms of the percentage 
difference of the performance of Contract DTDP over that of Contract FWTP . We 
consider one factor at a time and use average percentage difference in the graphs. 
The performance measure is mathematically defined by the following expression.  
( ) ( )( ) ( )6 6
1 1
100 , , , , , ,DTDP FWTP FWTPi i i
i i
Q w C Q w C Q w C
= =
× Ψ − Ψ Ψ∑ ∑  
 The raw data to illustrate the comparison between the two contracts is also 
given in Appendix-A. In addition, the summary of average performance for each 
factor is included in Appendix-B.  
 In what follows, we first discuss the effects of production, inventory and 
tardiness costs. Then we proceed with analyses of the effect imposed by the 
portion of the production period residing within the demand period. We conclude 
our experimental investigation with observations on the impact of the degree of 
stochasticty of retailer demand on the relative performance of the two contracts. 
 The Effect of Production Cost: Figure-3 depicts the average percentage 
performance of Contract DTDP over contract FWTP for five different values of 
production cost. The results indicate that Contract DTDP becomes more 
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preferable as the production cost increases in the market. More specifically, if the 
cost is 0.4, then the relative performance is around 38%, which means that 
Contract DTDP generates 38% more profit relative to Contract FWTP. 
Interestingly, Contract DTDP is still more preferable even if there is no production 
cost at all. This observation may be important also in that it once again 
emphasizes the value of information sharing in supply chain settings.  
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Figure-3: The effect of production cost on the performance of DTDP relative to 
that of FWTP 
 
 The Effect of Inventory Cost: Figure-4 illustrates the effect of inventory cost 
on the relative performance of DTDP. In parallel with the effect of the production 
cost, Contract DTDP generates more profit than Contract FWTP and this 
difference becomes more marked  for increasing values of the inventory cost. This 
observation can be explained based on the formulation of the two contracts. In 
both contracts, inventory cost per order is proportional to the square of the order 
size. We know that order sizes in Contract DTDP decreases if the order is 
committed to be shipped within the demand period. This is simply because it 
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considers the loss in demand for deliveries within that period. Thus, Contract 
DTDP reduces inventory costs, generates more profits and becomes more and 
more desirable in the market with increasing inventory costs.  
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Figure-4: The effect of inventory cost on the performance of DTDP relative to 
that of FWTP 
 
 The Effect of Tardiness Cost: The impact of tardiness cost on the relative 
performance of the two contracts is shown in Figure-5. Recall that tardiness cost 
has no effect on the manufacturer’s profit under Contract DTDP. Although 
Contract FWTP outperforms Contract DTDP in some instances with lower 
tardiness cost. However, using Contract DTDP is more advantageous on the 
average. As it is expected,   the difference in performance becomes increasingly 
more significant as the tardiness cost increases and it changes as an approximate 
linear function of the tardiness cost.  
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Figure-5: The effect of tardiness cost on the performance of DTDP relative to that 
of FWTP 
 
 The Effect of Production Capacity within Demand Period: Figure-6 
provides a graphical summary of the effect of production capacity within the 
demand period on the relative performance measure. Contract DTDP outperforms 
FWTP on average. Furthermore, there is an indication that the manufacturer 
should carefully decide on the optimal capacity allocation within the demand 
period to ensure maximum profitability.  This is reasonable because there will be 
some optimal production capacity allocations within the demand period.  
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Figure-6: The effect of production capacity within demand period on the 
performance of DTDP relative to that of FWTP 
 
 The Effect of Stochasticity: The effect of demand stochasticity on the 
average percentage difference in performance  is depicted in Figure-7. Contract 
DTDP generates more profits in both levels of the factor on average. Difference in 
performance is more significant when the CV is set at 5%. This observation is due 
to the fact that retailers tend to place smaller orders in a highly stochastic demand 
environment, and hence the manufacturer is able to complete the production in 
shorter time. This implies that the manufacturer incurs less tardiness cost in 
Contract FWTP under a highly stochastic demand and the difference in the 
performance of the two contracts decreases as the demand stochasticity gets 
higher. 
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Figure-7: The effect of stochasticity on the performance of DTDP relative to that 
of FWTP 
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C h a p t e r  6  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis considered the problem of coordinating the pricing and production 
scheduling decisions of a manufacturer who sells a single product to multiple 
retailers in a two-stage decentralized supply chain operating under a single period 
stochastic demand environment. Retailers’ demand information is assumed to be 
known by the manufacturer. The main approach is to prepare price menus to set 
different wholesale prices for different due dates and have the retailers adjust their 
optimal order quantities and delivery times in a way to support a more efficient 
utilization of manufacturer’s available production capacity. 
 
Application of the solution approach utilizes two separate procedures. The first 
procedure handles the preparation of the price menu composed of wholesale price 
and due-date pairs. This menu is prepared such that the buyers can attain at least the 
profit levels yielded by the base scenario with a fixed wholesale price and tardiness 
costs. There exists an optimal order quantity corresponding to each one of the pairs 
in the menu.  The second procedure uses the information implied by the price menu 
generated by the first routine and solves the manufacturer’s optimization problem to 
maximize his/her overall profits while respecting the capacity and delivery time 
constraints. A mathematical optimization program is proposed to solve this NP-hard 
deterministic problem. The solution reveals which orders are to be accepted at 
which prices, due-dates and order quantities.  
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Proposed methodology is tested via computational experimentation, and some basic 
managerial insights are produced based on the experimental results. The underlying 
notion supporting the proposed approach is that in supply chain systems, a 
manufacturer who has access to the demand information of its customers has the 
ability to form its price menus as a function of both time and quantity so as to 
maximize its profit without making the profit levels of its customers any worse. 
 
The performance of the proposed approach in terms of the manufacturer’s profit 
level is tested against that of the base scenario through computational 
experimentation. The scenarios considered in the experimentation are generated 
systematically by varying certain factors such as the level of stochasticity in 
retailers’ demand distribution, the magnitudes of the production, inventory 
holding and tardiness costs, and the portions of the production period lying before 
and after the beginning of the demand season.  Results briefly indicate that the 
proposed approach has significant advantages over the base scenario particularly 
when the retailers experience high demands with low levels of stochasticity, and 
the manufacturer has high production, inventory holding and tardiness costs. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A. The Raw Data Containing All Instances in Experimental Design 
 
 There are four tables and each of them is for one level of production capacity 
within the demand period. The first four columns contain the levels of 
stochasticity, production, tardiness and inventory costs. The last column is the 
percentage difference of the performance of Contract DTDP over that of Contract 
FWTP. 
 Table 1a: Raw Data for Production Capacity of 140 within the demand period  
Production capacity within demand period = 140 
CV Production cost Inventory cost Tardiness cost Performance 
5 0 0 0 3.37% 
5 0.1 0 0 3.10% 
5 0.2 0 0 2.73% 
5 0.3 0 0 2.18% 
5 0.4 0 0 1.31% 
5 0 0.002 0 3.46% 
5 0.1 0.002 0 3.16% 
5 0.2 0.002 0 2.72% 
5 0.3 0.002 0 2.01% 
5 0.4 0.002 0 0.80% 
5 0 0.003 0 3.52% 
5 0.1 0.003 0 3.20% 
5 0.2 0.003 0 2.72% 
5 0.3 0.003 0 1.97% 
5 0.4 0.003 0 0.41% 
5 0 0.004 0 3.59% 
5 0.1 0.004 0 3.25% 
5 0.2 0.004 0 2.78% 
5 0.3 0.004 0 1.92% 
5 0.4 0.004 0 -0.17% 
5 0 0.005 0 3.68% 
5 0.1 0.005 0 3.37% 
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5 0.2 0.005 0 2.88% 
5 0.3 0.005 0 1.90% 
5 0.4 0.005 0 -1.19% 
5 0 0 0.0001 3.80% 
5 0.1 0 0.0001 3.60% 
5 0.2 0 0.0001 3.33% 
5 0.3 0 0.0001 2.92% 
5 0.4 0 0.0001 2.26% 
5 0 0.002 0.0001 3.97% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0001 3.76% 
5 0.2 0.002 0.0001 3.46% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0001 2.98% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0001 2.17% 
5 0 0.003 0.0001 4.07% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0001 3.87% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0001 3.55% 
5 0.3 0.003 0.0001 3.10% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0001 2.16% 
5 0 0.004 0.0001 4.19% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0001 3.99% 
5 0.2 0.004 0.0001 3.75% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0001 3.30% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0001 2.25% 
5 0 0.005 0.0001 4.34% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0001 4.21% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0001 4.02% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0001 3.66% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0001 2.74% 
5 0 0 0.0002 4.25% 
5 0.1 0 0.0002 4.12% 
5 0.2 0 0.0002 3.94% 
5 0.3 0 0.0002 3.68% 
5 0.4 0 0.0002 3.25% 
5 0 0.002 0.0002 4.48% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0002 4.37% 
5 0.2 0.002 0.0002 4.22% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0002 3.96% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0002 3.60% 
5 0 0.003 0.0002 4.63% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0002 4.54% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0002 4.41% 
 43
5 0.3 0.003 0.0002 4.28% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0002 4.01% 
5 0 0.004 0.0002 4.81% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0002 4.75% 
5 0.2 0.004 0.0002 4.74% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0002 4.74% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0002 4.86% 
5 0 0.005 0.0002 5.02% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0002 5.07% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0002 5.19% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0002 5.52% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0002 7.20% 
5 0 0 0.0004 5.15% 
5 0.1 0 0.0004 5.17% 
5 0.2 0 0.0004 5.20% 
5 0.3 0 0.0004 5.24% 
5 0.4 0 0.0004 5.31% 
5 0 0.002 0.0004 5.53% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0004 5.63% 
5 0.2 0.002 0.0004 5.78% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0004 6.03% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0004 6.66% 
5 0 0.003 0.0004 5.78% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0004 5.94% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0004 6.19% 
5 0.3 0.003 0.0004 6.74% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0004 8.04% 
5 0 0.004 0.0004 6.06% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0004 6.32% 
5 0.2 0.004 0.0004 6.81% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0004 7.80% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0004 10.77% 
5 0 0.005 0.0004 6.42% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0004 6.86% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0004 7.67% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0004 9.57% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0004 18.44% 
5 0 0 0.0005 5.61% 
5 0.1 0 0.0005 5.71% 
5 0.2 0 0.0005 5.84% 
5 0.3 0 0.0005 6.05% 
 44
5 0.4 0 0.0005 6.39% 
5 0 0.002 0.0005 6.07% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0005 6.28% 
5 0.2 0.002 0.0005 6.59% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0005 7.11% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0005 8.29% 
5 0 0.003 0.0005 6.36% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0005 6.66% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0005 7.12% 
5 0.3 0.003 0.0005 8.05% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0005 10.24% 
5 0 0.004 0.0005 6.71% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0005 7.13% 
5 0.2 0.004 0.0005 7.89% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0005 9.44% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0005 14.17% 
5 0 0.005 0.0005 7.13% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0005 7.79% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0005 8.98% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0005 11.79% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0005 25.92% 
30 0 0 0 2.69% 
30 0 0.002 0 2.74% 
30 0 0.003 0 2.77% 
30 0 0.004 0 2.82% 
30 0 0.005 0 2.87% 
30 0.1 0 0 2.55% 
30 0.1 0.002 0 2.60% 
30 0.1 0.003 0 2.63% 
30 0.1 0.004 0 2.67% 
30 0.1 0.005 0 2.73% 
30 0.2 0 0 2.36% 
30 0.2 0.002 0 2.40% 
30 0.2 0.003 0 2.43% 
30 0.2 0.004 0 2.47% 
30 0.2 0.005 0 2.53% 
30 0.3 0 0 2.10% 
30 0.3 0.002 0 2.10% 
30 0.3 0.003 0 2.11% 
30 0.3 0.004 0 2.13% 
30 0.3 0.005 0 2.16% 
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30 0.4 0 0 1.69% 
30 0.4 0.002 0 1.59% 
30 0.4 0.003 0 1.53% 
30 0.4 0.004 0 1.44% 
30 0.4 0.005 0 1.33% 
30 0 0 0.0001 3.06% 
30 0 0.002 0.0001 3.16% 
30 0 0.003 0.0001 3.22% 
30 0 0.004 0.0001 3.30% 
30 0 0.005 0.0001 3.39% 
30 0.1 0 0.0001 2.98% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0001 3.09% 
30 0.1 0.003 0.0001 3.17% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0001 3.26% 
30 0.1 0.005 0.0001 3.37% 
30 0.2 0 0.0001 2.87% 
30 0.2 0.002 0.0001 3.00% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0001 3.09% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0001 3.20% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0001 3.35% 
30 0.3 0 0.0001 2.72% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0001 2.87% 
30 0.3 0.003 0.0001 2.97% 
30 0.3 0.004 0.0001 3.12% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0001 3.32% 
30 0.4 0 0.0001 2.50% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0001 2.64% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0001 2.77% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0001 2.96% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0001 3.29% 
30 0 0 0.0002 3.45% 
30 0 0.002 0.0002 3.59% 
30 0 0.003 0.0002 3.68% 
30 0 0.004 0.0002 3.79% 
30 0 0.005 0.0002 3.92% 
30 0.1 0 0.0002 3.42% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0002 3.60% 
30 0.1 0.003 0.0002 3.71% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0002 3.85% 
30 0.1 0.005 0.0002 4.02% 
30 0.2 0 0.0002 3.40% 
 46
30 0.2 0.002 0.0002 3.62% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0002 3.77% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0002 3.95% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0002 4.19% 
30 0.3 0 0.0002 3.36% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0002 3.65% 
30 0.3 0.003 0.0002 3.86% 
30 0.3 0.004 0.0002 4.14% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0002 4.52% 
30 0.4 0 0.0002 3.32% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0002 3.73% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0002 4.07% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0002 4.57% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0002 5.38% 
30 0 0 0.0004 4.22% 
30 0 0.002 0.0004 4.47% 
30 0 0.003 0.0004 4.62% 
30 0 0.004 0.0004 4.80% 
30 0 0.005 0.0004 5.00% 
30 0.1 0 0.0004 4.33% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0004 4.64% 
30 0.1 0.003 0.0004 4.84% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0004 5.08% 
30 0.1 0.005 0.0004 5.36% 
30 0.2 0 0.0004 4.47% 
30 0.2 0.002 0.0004 4.89% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0004 5.17% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0004 5.52% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0004 5.95% 
30 0.3 0 0.0004 4.69% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0004 5.30% 
30 0.3 0.003 0.0004 5.73% 
30 0.3 0.004 0.0004 6.30% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0004 7.09% 
30 0.4 0 0.0004 5.05% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0004 6.04% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0004 6.85% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0004 8.06% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0004 10.08% 
30 0 0 0.0005 4.62% 
30 0 0.002 0.0005 4.92% 
 47
30 0 0.003 0.0005 5.10% 
30 0 0.004 0.0005 5.31% 
30 0 0.005 0.0005 5.56% 
30 0.1 0 0.0005 4.79% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0005 5.17% 
30 0.1 0.003 0.0005 5.42% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0005 5.71% 
30 0.1 0.005 0.0005 6.06% 
30 0.2 0 0.0005 5.02% 
30 0.2 0.002 0.0005 5.55% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0005 5.90% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0005 6.33% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0005 6.88% 
30 0.3 0 0.0005 5.37% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0005 6.15% 
30 0.3 0.003 0.0005 6.71% 
30 0.3 0.004 0.0005 7.44% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0005 8.46% 
30 0.4 0 0.0005 5.96% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0005 7.27% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0005 8.35% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0005 9.98% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0005 12.75% 
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 Table 1b: Raw Data for Production Capacity of 280 within the demand period  
Production capacity within demand period = 280 
CV Production cost Inventory cost Tardiness cost Performance 
5 0 0 0.0001 1.93% 
5 0 0.002 0.0001 2.39% 
5 0 0.003 0.0001 2.72% 
5 0 0.004 0.0001 3.12% 
5 0 0.005 0.0001 3.60% 
5 0.1 0 0.0001 1.62% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0001 2.16% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0001 2.54% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0001 3.01% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0001 3.61% 
5 0.2 0 0.0001 1.20% 
5 0.2 0.002 0.0001 1.83% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0001 2.26% 
5 0.2 0.004 0.0001 2.84% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0001 3.62% 
5 0.3 0 0.0001 0.63% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0001 1.28% 
5 0.3 0.003 0.0001 1.79% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0001 2.51% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0001 3.68% 
5 0.4 0 0.0001 -0.27% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0001 0.28% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0001 0.80% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0001 1.78% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0001 4.24% 
5 0 0 0.0002 2.97% 
5 0 0.002 0.0002 3.62% 
5 0 0.003 0.0002 4.06% 
5 0 0.004 0.0002 4.60% 
5 0 0.005 0.0002 5.24% 
5 0.1 0 0.0002 2.83% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0002 3.62% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0002 4.17% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0002 4.85% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0002 5.71% 
5 0.2 0 0.0002 2.65% 
5 0.2 0.002 0.0002 3.64% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0002 4.34% 
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5 0.2 0.004 0.0002 5.26% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0002 6.53% 
5 0.3 0 0.0002 2.42% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0002 3.66% 
5 0.3 0.003 0.0002 4.64% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0002 6.08% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0002 8.41% 
5 0.4 0 0.0002 2.08% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0002 3.77% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0002 5.41% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0002 8.57% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0002 17.15% 
5 0 0 0.0003 4.05% 
5 0 0.002 0.0003 4.88% 
5 0 0.003 0.0003 5.45% 
5 0 0.004 0.0003 6.13% 
5 0 0.005 0.0003 6.96% 
5 0.1 0 0.0003 4.09% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0003 5.14% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0003 5.87% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0003 6.77% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0003 7.93% 
5 0.2 0 0.0003 4.15% 
5 0.2 0.002 0.0003 5.54% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0003 6.53% 
5 0.2 0.004 0.0003 7.85% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0003 9.68% 
5 0.3 0 0.0003 4.31% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0003 6.22% 
5 0.3 0.003 0.0003 7.74% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0003 10.02% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0003 13.82% 
5 0.4 0 0.0003 4.59% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0003 7.63% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0003 10.68% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0003 16.88% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0003 36.59% 
5 0 0 0.0004 5.16% 
5 0 0.002 0.0004 6.19% 
5 0 0.003 0.0004 6.89% 
5 0 0.004 0.0004 7.73% 
 50
5 0 0.005 0.0004 8.76% 
5 0.1 0 0.0004 5.39% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0004 6.73% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0004 7.65% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0004 8.80% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0004 10.29% 
5 0.2 0 0.0004 5.72% 
5 0.2 0.002 0.0004 7.55% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0004 8.86% 
5 0.2 0.004 0.0004 10.62% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0004 13.11% 
5 0.3 0 0.0004 6.29% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0004 8.95% 
5 0.3 0.003 0.0004 11.12% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0004 14.42% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0004 20.11% 
5 0.4 0 0.0004 7.29% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0004 11.94% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0004 16.81% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0004 27.48% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0004 58.24% 
5 0 0 0.0005 6.30% 
5 0 0.002 0.0005 7.55% 
5 0 0.003 0.0005 8.39% 
5 0 0.004 0.0005 9.40% 
5 0 0.005 0.0005 10.64% 
5 0.1 0 0.0005 6.74% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0005 8.39% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0005 9.52% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0005 10.95% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0005 12.80% 
5 0.2 0 0.0005 7.37% 
5 0.2 0.002 0.0005 9.67% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0005 11.35% 
5 0.2 0.004 0.0005 13.62% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0005 16.87% 
5 0.3 0 0.0005 8.39% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0005 11.91% 
5 0.3 0.003 0.0005 14.82% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0005 19.37% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0005 27.56% 
 51
5 0.4 0 0.0005 10.20% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0005 16.80% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0005 24.10% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0005 41.31% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0005 79.83% 
30 0 0 0.0001 1.76% 
30 0 0.002 0.0001 2.02% 
30 0 0.003 0.0001 2.17% 
30 0 0.004 0.0001 2.36% 
30 0 0.005 0.0001 2.57% 
30 0.1 0 0.0001 1.63% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0001 1.92% 
30 0.1 0.003 0.0001 2.10% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0001 2.32% 
30 0.1 0.005 0.0001 2.59% 
30 0.2 0 0.0001 1.45% 
30 0.2 0.002 0.0001 1.78% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0001 2.00% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0001 2.27% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0001 2.62% 
30 0.3 0 0.0001 1.19% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0001 1.57% 
30 0.3 0.003 0.0001 1.85% 
30 0.3 0.004 0.0001 2.21% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0001 2.71% 
30 0.4 0 0.0001 0.80% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0001 1.22% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0001 1.57% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0001 2.09% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0001 2.94% 
30 0 0 0.0002 2.60% 
30 0 0.002 0.0002 2.97% 
30 0 0.003 0.0002 3.19% 
30 0 0.004 0.0002 3.45% 
30 0 0.005 0.0002 3.75% 
30 0.1 0 0.0002 2.60% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0002 3.04% 
30 0.1 0.003 0.0002 3.32% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0002 3.64% 
30 0.1 0.005 0.0002 4.05% 
30 0.2 0 0.0002 2.60% 
 52
30 0.2 0.002 0.0002 3.15% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0002 3.51% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0002 3.96% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0002 4.53% 
30 0.3 0 0.0002 2.61% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0002 3.33% 
30 0.3 0.003 0.0002 3.85% 
30 0.3 0.004 0.0002 4.53% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0002 5.48% 
30 0.4 0 0.0002 2.63% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0002 3.68% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0002 4.54% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0002 5.83% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0002 7.97% 
30 0 0 0.0003 3.47% 
30 0 0.002 0.0003 3.95% 
30 0 0.003 0.0003 4.24% 
30 0 0.004 0.0003 4.58% 
30 0 0.005 0.0003 4.98% 
30 0.1 0 0.0003 3.61% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0003 4.20% 
30 0.1 0.003 0.0003 4.58% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0003 5.03% 
30 0.1 0.005 0.0003 5.58% 
30 0.2 0 0.0003 3.80% 
30 0.2 0.002 0.0003 4.59% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0003 5.11% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0003 5.75% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0003 6.57% 
30 0.3 0 0.0003 4.10% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0003 5.21% 
30 0.3 0.003 0.0003 6.00% 
30 0.3 0.004 0.0003 7.05% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0003 8.52% 
30 0.4 0 0.0003 4.59% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0003 6.37% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0003 7.83% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0003 10.08% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0003 13.97% 
30 0 0 0.0004 4.36% 
30 0 0.002 0.0004 4.96% 
 53
30 0 0.003 0.0004 5.33% 
30 0 0.004 0.0004 5.76% 
30 0 0.005 0.0004 6.26% 
30 0.1 0 0.0004 4.65% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0004 5.42% 
30 0.1 0.003 0.0004 5.91% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0004 6.49% 
30 0.1 0.005 0.0004 7.20% 
30 0.2 0 0.0004 5.05% 
30 0.2 0.002 0.0004 6.09% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0004 6.79% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0004 7.66% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0004 8.76% 
30 0.3 0 0.0004 5.67% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0004 7.20% 
30 0.3 0.003 0.0004 8.31% 
30 0.3 0.004 0.0004 9.79% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0004 11.90% 
30 0.4 0 0.0004 6.69% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0004 9.31% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0004 11.51% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0004 15.00% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0004 21.31% 
30 0 0 0.0005 5.28% 
30 0 0.002 0.0005 6.01% 
30 0 0.003 0.0005 6.46% 
30 0 0.004 0.0005 6.98% 
30 0 0.005 0.0005 7.60% 
30 0.1 0 0.0005 5.72% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0005 6.68% 
30 0.1 0.003 0.0005 7.29% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0005 8.01% 
30 0.1 0.005 0.0005 8.90% 
30 0.2 0 0.0005 6.35% 
30 0.2 0.002 0.0005 7.68% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0005 8.57% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0005 9.68% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0005 11.10% 
30 0.3 0 0.0005 7.32% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0005 9.33% 
30 0.3 0.003 0.0005 10.80% 
 54
30 0.3 0.004 0.0005 12.79% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0005 15.66% 
30 0.4 0 0.0005 8.94% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0005 12.56% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0005 15.67% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0005 20.77% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0005 30.62% 
 
Table 1c: Raw Data for Production Capacity of 420 within the demand period  
Production capacity within demand period = 420 
CV Production cost Inventory cost Tardiness cost Performance 
5 0 0 0 -3.84% 
5 0 0.002 0 -3.61% 
5 0 0.003 0 -3.47% 
5 0 0.004 0 -3.30% 
5 0 0.005 0 -3.09% 
5 0.1 0 0 -4.49% 
5 0.1 0.002 0 -4.35% 
5 0.1 0.003 0 -4.25% 
5 0.1 0.004 0 -4.12% 
5 0.1 0.005 0 -3.97% 
5 0.2 0 0 -5.39% 
5 0.2 0.002 0 -5.42% 
5 0.2 0.003 0 -5.44% 
5 0.2 0.004 0 -5.45% 
5 0.2 0.005 0 -5.42% 
5 0.3 0 0 -6.71% 
5 0.3 0.002 0 -7.14% 
5 0.3 0.003 0 -7.46% 
5 0.3 0.004 0 -7.84% 
5 0.3 0.005 0 -8.37% 
5 0.4 0 0 -8.78% 
5 0.4 0.002 0 -10.27% 
5 0.4 0.003 0 -11.51% 
5 0.4 0.004 0 -13.67% 
5 0.4 0.005 0 -18.43% 
5 0 0 0.0001 -2.44% 
5 0 0.002 0.0001 -1.99% 
5 0 0.003 0.0001 -1.70% 
5 0 0.004 0.0001 -1.35% 
 55
5 0 0.005 0.0001 -0.93% 
5 0.1 0 0.0001 -2.88% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0001 -2.42% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0001 -2.12% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0001 -1.74% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0001 -1.25% 
5 0.2 0 0.0001 -3.50% 
5 0.2 0.002 0.0001 -3.08% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0001 -2.77% 
5 0.2 0.004 0.0001 -2.36% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0001 -1.76% 
5 0.3 0 0.0001 -4.40% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0001 -4.13% 
5 0.3 0.003 0.0001 -3.90% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0001 -3.49% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0001 -2.76% 
5 0.4 0 0.0001 -5.83% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0001 -6.06% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0001 -6.15% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0001 -6.26% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0001 -6.42% 
5 0 0 0.0002 -0.98% 
5 0 0.002 0.0002 -0.27% 
5 0 0.003 0.0002 0.18% 
5 0 0.004 0.0002 0.72% 
5 0 0.005 0.0002 1.38% 
5 0.1 0 0.0002 -1.19% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0002 -0.38% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0002 0.16% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0002 0.84% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0002 1.72% 
5 0.2 0 0.0002 -1.49% 
5 0.2 0.002 0.0002 -0.54% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0002 0.14% 
5 0.2 0.004 0.0002 1.05% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0002 2.37% 
5 0.3 0 0.0002 -1.91% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0002 -0.79% 
5 0.3 0.003 0.0002 0.12% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0002 1.58% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0002 4.09% 
 56
5 0.4 0 0.0002 -2.57% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0002 -1.17% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0002 0.39% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0002 3.64% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0002 14.20% 
5 0 0 0.0004 2.15% 
5 0 0.002 0.0004 3.44% 
5 0 0.003 0.0004 4.28% 
5 0 0.004 0.0004 5.29% 
5 0 0.005 0.0004 6.55% 
5 0.1 0 0.0004 2.48% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0004 4.13% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0004 5.26% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0004 6.69% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0004 8.57% 
5 0.2 0 0.0004 2.97% 
5 0.2 0.002 0.0004 5.21% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0004 6.86% 
5 0.2 0.004 0.0004 9.15% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0004 12.56% 
5 0.3 0 0.0004 3.74% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0004 7.13% 
5 0.3 0.003 0.0004 10.02% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0004 14.82% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0004 24.05% 
5 0.4 0 0.0004 5.17% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0004 11.64% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0004 19.49% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0004 36.17% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0004 64.76% 
5 0 0 0.0005 3.83% 
5 0 0.002 0.0005 5.47% 
5 0 0.003 0.0005 6.53% 
5 0 0.004 0.0005 7.83% 
5 0 0.005 0.0005 9.46% 
5 0.1 0 0.0005 4.49% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0005 6.64% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0005 8.12% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0005 10.03% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0005 12.58% 
5 0.2 0 0.0005 5.44% 
 57
5 0.2 0.002 0.0005 8.50% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0005 10.80% 
5 0.2 0.004 0.0005 14.03% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0005 18.99% 
5 0.3 0 0.0005 6.97% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0005 11.91% 
5 0.3 0.003 0.0005 16.29% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0005 23.88% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0005 38.64% 
5 0.4 0 0.0005 9.85% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0005 20.41% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0005 33.33% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0005 53.84% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0005 89.49% 
30 0 0 0 -2.95% 
30 0 0 0.0001 -1.92% 
30 0 0 0.0002 -0.85% 
30 0 0 0.0004 1.43% 
30 0 0 0.0005 2.66% 
30 0.1 0 0 -3.23% 
30 0.1 0 0.0001 -2.05% 
30 0.1 0 0.0002 -0.80% 
30 0.1 0 0.0004 1.88% 
30 0.1 0 0.0005 3.33% 
30 0.2 0 0 -3.59% 
30 0.2 0 0.0001 -2.20% 
30 0.2 0 0.0002 -0.72% 
30 0.2 0 0.0004 2.52% 
30 0.2 0 0.0005 4.31% 
30 0.3 0 0 -4.11% 
30 0.3 0 0.0001 -2.42% 
30 0.3 0 0.0002 -0.59% 
30 0.3 0 0.0004 3.51% 
30 0.3 0 0.0005 5.83% 
30 0.4 0 0 -4.93% 
30 0.4 0 0.0001 -2.76% 
30 0.4 0 0.0002 -0.38% 
30 0.4 0 0.0004 5.20% 
30 0.4 0 0.0005 8.51% 
30 0 0.002 0 -2.82% 
30 0 0.002 0.0001 -1.66% 
 58
30 0 0.002 0.0002 -0.45% 
30 0 0.002 0.0004 2.17% 
30 0 0.002 0.0005 3.58% 
30 0.1 0.002 0 -3.09% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0001 -1.74% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0002 -0.30% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0004 2.85% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0005 4.58% 
30 0.2 0.002 0 -3.49% 
30 0.2 0.002 0.0001 -1.84% 
30 0.2 0.002 0.0002 -0.08% 
30 0.2 0.002 0.0004 3.87% 
30 0.2 0.002 0.0005 6.10% 
30 0.3 0.002 0 -4.08% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0001 -1.99% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0002 0.29% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0004 5.59% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0005 8.71% 
30 0.4 0.002 0 -5.10% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0001 -2.24% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0002 1.00% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0004 9.07% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0005 14.25% 
30 0 0.003 0 -2.73% 
30 0 0.003 0.0001 -1.50% 
30 0 0.003 0.0002 -0.20% 
30 0 0.003 0.0004 2.62% 
30 0 0.003 0.0005 4.16% 
30 0.1 0.003 0 -3.01% 
30 0.1 0.003 0.0001 -1.54% 
30 0.1 0.003 0.0002 0.02% 
30 0.1 0.003 0.0004 3.47% 
30 0.1 0.003 0.0005 5.38% 
30 0.2 0.003 0 -3.41% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0001 -1.60% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0002 0.35% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0004 4.78% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0005 7.31% 
30 0.3 0.003 0 -4.04% 
30 0.3 0.003 0.0001 -1.68% 
30 0.3 0.003 0.0002 0.94% 
 59
30 0.3 0.003 0.0004 7.14% 
30 0.3 0.003 0.0005 10.89% 
30 0.4 0.003 0 -5.22% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0001 -1.82% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0002 2.13% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0004 12.51% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0005 19.66% 
30 0 0.004 0 -2.63% 
30 0 0.004 0.0001 -1.30% 
30 0 0.004 0.0002 0.10% 
30 0 0.004 0.0004 3.15% 
30 0 0.004 0.0005 4.83% 
30 0.1 0.004 0 -2.91% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0001 -1.31% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0002 0.40% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0004 4.20% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0005 6.34% 
30 0.2 0.004 0 -3.31% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0001 -1.30% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0002 0.90% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0004 5.94% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0005 8.88% 
30 0.3 0.004 0 -3.99% 
30 0.3 0.004 0.0001 -1.27% 
30 0.3 0.004 0.0002 1.79% 
30 0.3 0.004 0.0004 9.27% 
30 0.3 0.004 0.0005 13.97% 
30 0.4 0.004 0 -5.39% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0001 -1.19% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0002 3.87% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0004 18.39% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0005 29.19% 
30 0 0.005 0 -2.52% 
30 0 0.005 0.0001 -1.08% 
30 0 0.005 0.0002 0.43% 
30 0 0.005 0.0004 3.77% 
30 0 0.005 0.0005 5.62% 
30 0.1 0.005 0 -2.78% 
30 0.1 0.005 0.0001 -1.02% 
30 0.1 0.005 0.0002 0.86% 
30 0.1 0.005 0.0004 5.12% 
 60
30 0.1 0.005 0.0005 7.53% 
30 0.2 0.005 0 -3.18% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0001 -0.92% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0002 1.58% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0004 7.44% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0005 10.93% 
30 0.3 0.005 0 -3.92% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0001 -0.72% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0002 2.97% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0004 12.39% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0005 18.64% 
30 0.4 0.005 0 -5.60% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0001 -0.12% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0002 6.94% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0004 30.10% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0005 44.42% 
 
 Table 1d: Raw Data for Production Capacity of 585 within the demand period  
Production capacity within demand period = 585 
CV Production cost Inventory cost Tardiness cost Performance 
5 0 0 0.0001 -7.00% 
5 0 0.002 0.0001 -6.58% 
5 0 0.003 0.0001 -6.22% 
5 0 0.004 0.0001 -5.65% 
5 0 0.005 0.0001 -5.21% 
5 0.1 0 0.0001 -7.24% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0001 -6.66% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0001 -5.98% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0001 -5.79% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0001 -5.04% 
5 0.2 0 0.0001 -7.63% 
5 0.2 0.002 0.0001 -6.91% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0001 -6.38% 
5 0.2 0.004 0.0001 -5.67% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0001 -4.72% 
5 0.3 0 0.0001 -7.92% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0001 -7.30% 
5 0.3 0.003 0.0001 -6.79% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0001 -5.73% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0001 -4.05% 
 61
5 0.4 0 0.0001 -8.72% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0001 -6.94% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0001 -7.26% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0001 -5.10% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0001 1.18% 
5 0 0 0.0002 -5.65% 
5 0 0.002 0.0002 -4.80% 
5 0 0.003 0.0002 -3.94% 
5 0 0.004 0.0002 -3.54% 
5 0 0.005 0.0002 -2.78% 
5 0.1 0 0.0002 -5.56% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0002 -4.40% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0002 -3.64% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0002 -3.09% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0002 -1.83% 
5 0.2 0 0.0002 -5.50% 
5 0.2 0.002 0.0002 -4.19% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0002 -3.26% 
5 0.2 0.004 0.0002 -1.99% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0002 -0.07% 
5 0.3 0 0.0002 -4.98% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0002 -3.41% 
5 0.3 0.003 0.0002 -2.14% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0002 0.11% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0002 4.28% 
5 0.4 0 0.0002 -4.67% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0002 -1.77% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0002 1.87% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0002 7.53% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0002 28.26% 
5 0 0 0.0003 -3.90% 
5 0 0.002 0.0003 -2.59% 
5 0 0.003 0.0003 -2.04% 
5 0 0.004 0.0003 -1.08% 
5 0 0.005 0.0003 0.09% 
5 0.1 0 0.0003 -3.49% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0003 -2.04% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0003 -1.02% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0003 0.26% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0003 1.90% 
5 0.2 0 0.0003 -2.91% 
 62
5 0.2 0.002 0.0003 -0.86% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0003 0.32% 
5 0.2 0.004 0.0003 2.92% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0003 5.54% 
5 0.3 0 0.0003 -2.34% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0003 0.77% 
5 0.3 0.003 0.0003 3.25% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0003 7.81% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0003 15.80% 
5 0.4 0 0.0003 -0.90% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0003 4.69% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0003 11.16% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0003 27.27% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0003 90.05% 
5 0 0 0.0004 -2.16% 
5 0 0.002 0.0004 -0.64% 
5 0 0.003 0.0004 0.32% 
5 0 0.004 0.0004 1.46% 
5 0 0.005 0.0004 2.89% 
5 0.1 0 0.0004 -1.41% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0004 0.66% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0004 1.93% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0004 3.79% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0004 6.25% 
5 0.2 0 0.0004 -0.54% 
5 0.2 0.002 0.0004 2.32% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0004 4.76% 
5 0.2 0.004 0.0004 7.32% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0004 13.25% 
5 0.3 0 0.0004 0.83% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0004 5.04% 
5 0.3 0.003 0.0004 10.26% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0004 17.64% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0004 31.09% 
5 0.4 0 0.0004 3.08% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0004 13.38% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0004 26.79% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0004 46.36% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0004 125.72% 
5 0 0 0.0005 -0.37% 
5 0 0.002 0.0005 1.26% 
 63
5 0 0.003 0.0005 2.85% 
5 0 0.004 0.0005 4.17% 
5 0 0.005 0.0005 6.34% 
5 0.1 0 0.0005 0.64% 
5 0.1 0.002 0.0005 3.35% 
5 0.1 0.003 0.0005 5.09% 
5 0.1 0.004 0.0005 7.69% 
5 0.1 0.005 0.0005 11.40% 
5 0.2 0 0.0005 2.20% 
5 0.2 0.002 0.0005 6.21% 
5 0.2 0.003 0.0005 9.27% 
5 0.2 0.004 0.0005 13.54% 
5 0.2 0.005 0.0005 22.94% 
5 0.3 0 0.0005 3.93% 
5 0.3 0.002 0.0005 12.14% 
5 0.3 0.003 0.0005 17.79% 
5 0.3 0.004 0.0005 28.38% 
5 0.3 0.005 0.0005 50.51% 
5 0.4 0 0.0005 9.75% 
5 0.4 0.002 0.0005 24.26% 
5 0.4 0.003 0.0005 39.59% 
5 0.4 0.004 0.0005 66.13% 
5 0.4 0.005 0.0005 211.61% 
30 0 0 0.0001 -3.65% 
30 0 0 0.0002 -2.58% 
30 0 0 0.0003 -1.45% 
30 0 0 0.0004 -0.27% 
30 0 0 0.0005 0.98% 
30 0.1 0 0.0001 -3.76% 
30 0.1 0 0.0002 -2.51% 
30 0.1 0 0.0003 -1.20% 
30 0.1 0 0.0004 0.20% 
30 0.1 0 0.0005 1.68% 
30 0.2 0 0.0001 -3.89% 
30 0.2 0 0.0002 -2.41% 
30 0.2 0 0.0003 -0.82% 
30 0.2 0 0.0004 0.88% 
30 0.2 0 0.0005 2.72% 
30 0.3 0 0.0001 -4.08% 
30 0.3 0 0.0002 -2.24% 
30 0.3 0 0.0003 -0.25% 
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30 0.3 0 0.0004 1.94% 
30 0.3 0 0.0005 4.34% 
30 0.4 0 0.0001 -4.38% 
30 0.4 0 0.0002 -1.97% 
30 0.4 0 0.0003 0.72% 
30 0.4 0 0.0004 3.76% 
30 0.4 0 0.0005 7.25% 
30 0 0.002 0.0001 -3.40% 
30 0 0.002 0.0002 -2.18% 
30 0 0.002 0.0003 -0.90% 
30 0 0.002 0.0004 0.46% 
30 0 0.002 0.0005 1.91% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0001 -3.46% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0002 -2.01% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0003 -0.47% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0004 1.18% 
30 0.1 0.002 0.0005 2.95% 
30 0.2 0.002 0.0001 -3.54% 
30 0.2 0.002 0.0002 -1.76% 
30 0.2 0.002 0.0003 0.16% 
30 0.2 0.002 0.0004 2.25% 
30 0.2 0.002 0.0005 4.55% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0001 -3.66% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0002 -1.36% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0003 1.21% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0004 4.08% 
30 0.3 0.002 0.0005 7.34% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0001 -3.84% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0002 -0.55% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0003 3.28% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0004 7.86% 
30 0.4 0.002 0.0005 13.50% 
30 0 0.003 0.0001 -3.24% 
30 0 0.003 0.0002 -1.93% 
30 0 0.003 0.0003 -0.55% 
30 0 0.003 0.0004 0.92% 
30 0 0.003 0.0005 2.49% 
30 0.1 0.003 0.0001 -3.27% 
30 0.1 0.003 0.0002 -1.70% 
30 0.1 0.003 0.0003 -0.01% 
30 0.1 0.003 0.0004 1.80% 
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30 0.1 0.003 0.0005 3.76% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0001 -3.31% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0002 -1.34% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0003 0.81% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0004 3.18% 
30 0.2 0.003 0.0005 5.81% 
30 0.3 0.003 0.0001 -3.35% 
30 0.3 0.003 0.0002 -0.70% 
30 0.3 0.003 0.0003 2.28% 
30 0.3 0.003 0.0004 5.70% 
30 0.3 0.003 0.0005 9.67% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0001 -3.41% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0002 0.61% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0003 5.49% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0004 11.60% 
30 0.4 0.003 0.0005 19.59% 
30 0 0.004 0.0001 -3.05% 
30 0 0.004 0.0002 -1.65% 
30 0 0.004 0.0003 -0.15% 
30 0 0.004 0.0004 1.45% 
30 0 0.004 0.0005 3.17% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0001 -3.05% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0002 -1.33% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0003 0.53% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0004 2.55% 
30 0.1 0.004 0.0005 4.74% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0001 -3.01% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0002 -0.80% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0003 1.65% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0004 4.37% 
30 0.2 0.004 0.0005 7.43% 
30 0.3 0.004 0.0001 -2.94% 
30 0.3 0.004 0.0002 0.16% 
30 0.3 0.004 0.0003 3.74% 
30 0.3 0.004 0.0004 7.94% 
30 0.3 0.004 0.0005 12.99% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0001 -2.77% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0002 2.42% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0003 9.09% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0004 18.22% 
30 0.4 0.004 0.0005 29.23% 
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30 0 0.005 0.0001 -2.84% 
30 0 0.005 0.0002 -1.31% 
30 0 0.005 0.0003 0.32% 
30 0 0.005 0.0004 2.07% 
30 0 0.005 0.0005 3.96% 
30 0.1 0.005 0.0001 -2.77% 
30 0.1 0.005 0.0002 -0.87% 
30 0.1 0.005 0.0003 1.20% 
30 0.1 0.005 0.0004 3.47% 
30 0.1 0.005 0.0005 5.97% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0001 -2.63% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0002 -0.11% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0003 2.71% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0004 5.91% 
30 0.2 0.005 0.0005 9.59% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0001 -2.38% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0002 1.37% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0003 5.82% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0004 11.26% 
30 0.3 0.005 0.0005 18.20% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0001 -1.67% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0002 5.65% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0003 16.20% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0004 30.12% 
30 0.4 0.005 0.0005 44.46% 
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B. Data for Bar Charts and Average Performance Results  
The following table contains the data used for Figure-3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
 Table 2: Summary of the data used for bar charts in the numerical results  
Production Cost Effect 
Levels Performance 
0 2.25% 
0.1 2.69% 
0.2 3.46% 
0.3 5.16% 
0.4 11.33% 
Inventory Cost Effect 
Levels Performance 
0 1.66% 
0.002 2.92% 
0.003 4.06% 
0.004 5.92% 
0.005 10.34% 
Tardiness Cost Effect 
Levels Performance 
0.0001 -1.35% 
0.0002 1.06% 
0.0003 4.01% 
0.0004 8.59% 
0.0005 12.58% 
Effect of Production Capacity. within Demand Period 
Levels Performance 
140 4.69% 
280 7.36% 
420 3.24% 
585 4.63% 
Stochasticity Effect 
Levels Performance 
0.05 3.75% 
0.3 5.55% 
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Table 3: Summary of average performance results 
Production cost Performance Inventory cost Performance Tardiness cost Performance 
0 4.88% 0 4.14% 0.0001 2.35% 
0.1 4.87% 0.002 4.52% 0.0002 3.42% 
0.2 4.90% 0.003 4.86% 0.0003 4.55% 
0.3 5.04% 0.004 5.43% 0.0004 7.00% 
CV
=
30
 
0.4 6.00% 0.005 6.73% 0.0005 8.37% 
Production cost Performance Inventory cost Performance Tardiness cost Performance 
0 3.88% 0.00% 3.64% 0.0001 2.30% 
0.1 3.96% 0.20% 3.95% 0.0002 3.07% 
0.2 4.09% 0.30% 4.18% 0.0003 3.86% 
0.3 4.34% 0.40% 4.49% 0.0004 5.54% P
ro
d.
 
ca
p.
 
w
ith
in
 
de
m
an
d 
pe
rio
d=
14
0 
CV
=
5 
0.4 4.93% 0.50% 4.94% 0.0005 6.43% 
Production cost Performance Inventory cost Performance Tardiness cost Performance 
0 5.55% 0 4.32% 0.0001 2.21% 
0.1 6.05% 0.002 6.05% 0.0002 5.05% 
0.2 6.91% 0.003 7.54% 0.0003 8.38% 
0.3 8.81% 0.004 10.16% 0.0004 12.08% 
CV
=
30
 
0.4 16.57% 0.005 15.80% 0.0005 16.15% 
Production cost Performance Inventory cost Performance Tardiness cost Performance 
0 4.28% 0 4.28% 0.0001 1.99% 
0.1 4.66% 0.002 4.66% 0.0002 3.79% 
0.2 5.26% 0.003 5.26% 0.0003 5.75% 
0.3 6.36% 0.004 6.36% 0.0004 7.89% P
ro
d.
 
ca
p.
 
w
ith
in
 
de
m
an
d 
pe
rio
d=
28
0 
CV
=
5 
0.4 9.14% 0.005 9.14% 0.0005 10.27% 
Production cost Performance Inventory cost Performance Tardiness cost Performance 
0 1.21% 0 -0.37% 0.0001 -6.63% 
0.1 1.54% 0.002 1.31% 0.0002 -3.27% 
0.2 2.22% 0.003 2.93% 0.0003 0.85% 
0.3 4.17% 0.004 5.60% 0.0004 11.30% 
CV
=
30
 
0.4 10.61% 0.005 10.28% 0.0005 17.49% 
Production cost Performance Inventory cost Performance Tardiness cost Performance 
0 0.48% 0 0.23% 0.0001 -3.68% 
0.1 0.89% 0.002 1.33% 0.0002 -1.57% 
0.2 1.57% 0.003 2.18% 0.0003 0.81% Pr
o
d.
 
ca
p.
 
w
ith
in
 
de
m
an
d 
pe
rio
d=
42
0 
CV
=
5 
0.3 2.93% 0.004 3.46% 0.0004 6.74% 
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  0.4 6.82% 0.005 5.48% 0.0005 10.38% 
Production cost Performance Inventory cost Performance Tardiness cost Performance 
0 -1.79% 0 -2.50% 0.0001 -6.05% 
0.1 -0.57% 0.002 0.60% 0.0002 -1.17% 
0.2 1.60% 0.003 3.46% 0.0003 5.95% 
0.3 6.60% 0.004 8.19% 0.0004 12.81% 
CV
=
30
 
0.4 28.13% 0.005 24.22% 0.0005 22.43% 
Production cost Performance Inventory cost Performance Tardiness cost Performance 
0 -0.46% 0 -0.44% 0.0001 -3.25% 
0.1 0.15% 0.002 0.94% 0.0002 -0.84% 
0.2 1.14% 0.003 2.04% 0.0003 1.98% 
0.3 3.08% 0.004 3.64% 0.0004 5.32% P
ro
d.
 
ca
p.
 
w
ith
in
 
de
m
an
d 
pe
rio
d=
58
5 
CV
=
5 
0.4 8.42% 0.005 6.15% 0.0005 9.13% 
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C. The Data for Endogenous Variable Number of Due-dates 
 
 Table-4 contains the data, number of due-dates and the corresponding profit in 
Contract DTDP, for Figure-2. 
Table 4: The data illustrating the effect of number of due-dates on the profit in Contract DTDP  
Number 
of Due-
dates 
Profit 
Contract 
DTDP 
Number 
of Due-
dates 
Profit 
Contract 
DTDP 
Number 
of Due-
dates 
Profit 
Contract 
DTDP 
Number 
of Due-
dates 
Profit 
Contract 
DTDP 
2 275.35 24 321.41 46 323.89 68 327.34 
3 299.65 25 322.15 47 322.61 69 325.21 
4 293.22 26 321.27 48 327.61 70 328.19 
5 304.30 27 324.12 49 328.49 71 328.31 
6 305.61 28 306.99 50 325.90 72 328.12 
7 297.38 29 314.37 51 327.03 73 327.60 
8 311.35 30 315.52 52 326.41 74 328.27 
9 316.26 31 315.24 53 324.53 75 327.19 
10 308.99 32 317.61 54 324.12 76 329.57 
11 320.82 33 325.99 55 330.65 77 330.11 
12 317.43 34 323.04 56 324.51 78 328.67 
13 318.46 35 320.71 57 326.01 79 327.85 
14 302.65 36 322.79 58 325.91 80 327.17 
15 315.09 37 323.67 59 327.09 81 327.80 
16 317.58 38 327.05 60 326.37 82 329.46 
17 317.78 39 324.47 61 325.34 83 324.03 
18 316.26 40 323.51 62 321.49 84 326.78 
19 323.03 41 327.33 63 328.75 85 328.03 
20 317.56 42 325.93 64 326.65 86 326.27 
21 322.80 43 325.57 65 327.44 87 327.47 
22 325.74 44 328.40 66 328.39 88 330.68 
23 320.45 45 326.36 67 326.72 89 326.81 
 
 
 
 
 
